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THE OUTWARD LIMIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR'S AUTHORITY OVER SUBMERGED LANDS-THE
EFFECT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ON THE
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF LANDS ACT
The Department of Interior (DOI) has authority to lease areas of the
United States Continental Shelf' for exploration and exploitation of all
minerals. 2 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) has authority to license exploration and recovery by United States
citizens of all hard minerals in the deep seabed outside the Continental
Shelf. 3 In March 1983 DOI published its intention to prepare an Environ-
mental Impact Statement4 for a proposed lease sale of polymetallic sulfides
in the Gorda Ridge area.5 DOI explained that it had authority to lease the
area6 although the Gorda Ridge falls outside the geological continental
shelf.7 It based its authority on, among other things, President Reagan's
March 1983 proclamation claiming a 200-mile exclusive economic zone
(EEZ) for the United States. 8
NOAA has no authority regarding polymetallic sulfides, since they are
not hard minerals. Nevertheless, DOI's claim of general authority over the
200-mile EEZ encroaches upon NOAA's statutory authority regarding
hard minerals in the deep seabed. NOAA responded to DOI's claim by
stating that the President's proclamation did not amend existing statutory
law creating the respective jurisdictions of the two agencies. 9
DOI's claim implicates doctrines of statutory and treaty construction,
separation of powers, and the domestic effect of customary international
law. After briefly establishing the relevant background of the controversy,
this Comment suggests that neither the President's proclamation nor the
I. The legal and the geological definitions of the continental shelf are not necessarily the same.
This Comment explores the question of what legal definition controls DOI's authority. For con-
venience, when the legal term is meant, initial capital letters will be used.
2. DOI's authority is established under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-56 (1982).
3. NOAA's authority is established under the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act, 30
U.S.C. §§ 1401-73 (1982).
4. 48 Fed. Reg. 12,840 (1983).
5. The Gorda Ridge area is an active seafloor spreading center located approximately 140 miles
west of Oregon and northern California. NOAA General Counsel Memo 1 (Feb. 1984) (Copy on file
with the Washington Law Review).
6. Letter from J.J. Simmons, Undersecretary of Interior, to Walter B. Jones, Chairman, Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries (Sept. 26, 1983) (Copy on file with the Washington Law Review).
7. The Gorda Ridge lies 140 miles west of the coast line. The geological continental shelf of the
west coast extends only about 40 miles from the coast line. See S. REP. No. 441, 83d Cong., Ist Sess. 4
(1953).
8. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983).
9. See NOAA General Counsel Memo, supra note 5, at 13.
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new customary law of the EEZ operates to change domestic law and
concludes that DOI's claim exceeds its authority under domestic law.
I. BACKGROUND
In 1945 President Truman proclaimed the exclusive right of the United
States to exploit the natural resources of its continental shelf. 10 At the same
time, President Truman issued Executive Order No. 9633. That order
placed the natural resources of the continental shelf under the control of the
Secretary of the Interior for administrative purposes, but did not give the
Secretary the authority to lease the area. "1 Although the proclamation did
not define the term "continental shelf," a contemporaneous White House
press release provided a geological definition: "submerged land which is
contiguous to the continent and which is covered by no more than 100
fathoms (600 feet) of water is considered as the continental shelf." ' 2
In 1953 Congress enacted the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act' 3
(OCSLA), which empowers the Secretary of the Interior to lease tracts on
the Continental Shelf. 14 Congress did not adopt the geological definition of
the Continental Shelf;15 rather, it defined the term as all lands seaward of
the submerged lands granted to the states' 6 "of which the subsoil and
seabed appertain to the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and
control. " 17
After President Truman's proclamation, which was the first of its kind, 18
a number of other states asserted similar claims over their continental
shelves. 19 The 1958 Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf2° (Shelf
Convention) represented the international community's attempt to codify
the emerging doctrine of the Continental Shelf. The Convention defined the
10. Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (1945).
11. S. REP. No. 441, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1945).
12. Press release dated Sept.28, 1945, Dept. of State Bull. 484, reprinted inS. REP. No. 44 , supra
note 11, at 53.
13. Pub. L. No. 212, ch. 345, 67 Stat. 462 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1982)).
14. 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982).
15. The White House press release, supra note 12, stated that the commonly accepted geological
definition of the shelf was submerged lands to a depth of 600 feet (or 200 meters).
16. The Submerged Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 31, ch. 65, 67 Stat. 29 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-15 (1982)), enacted prior to the OCSLA, grants to coastal states of the United States control of
land beneath navigable waters. Navigable waters are defined as those waters lying within three
geographical miles seaward of the coast line. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982).
17. Id. § 1331.
18. Holland, The Juridical Status of the Continental Shelf 30 TEx. L. REV. 586, 590 (1952).
19. Carter, The Seabed Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 4 STAN. J. INT'L STUD. 1, 2
(1969).
20. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499
U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter Shelf Convention].
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Continental Shelf as submerged lands "adjacent to the coast . . . to a
depth of 200 metres" or beyond that, to where the depth of the ocean
permits exploitation of seabed resources. 21 The Convention entered into
force for the United States in 1964.22
As seabed mining technology advanced, it became possible to recover
oil and gas in areas well over 200 meters beneath the ocean surface, 23 and at
least conceivable to mine hard minerals in areas beyond the continental
margin. 24 The possibility of recovering manganese nodules in the deep
seabed25 aroused the interest of United States corporations and the United
States Congress. 26 In 1980 Congress enacted the Deep Seabed Hard
Minerals Resources Act27 (DSHMRA), granting authority to NOAA to
license and regulate the activity of United States citizens exploring for and
recovering hard mineral resources in the area seaward of the Continental
Shelf of the United States and seaward of the Continental Shelf or EEZ of
any other nation. Section 4(2) of the DSHMRA defines the Continental
Shelf in terms identical to those of the 1958 Shelf Convention. 28 The
DSHMRA grants NOAA authority to issue permits for the recovery of
manganese nodules, 29 but not for the recovery of oil and gas or polymetallic
sulfides.
Under the existing statutory scheme, then, DOI has authority to lease oil
and gas and all minerals, including polymetallic sulfides, in any area of the
Continental Shelf as defined in the OCSLA. NOAA's authority is restricted
to regulation of United States citizens exploring for and recovering hard
minerals in areas beyond the Continental Shelf as defined in the DSHMRA.
In 1983 President Reagan proclaimed a 200 mile EEZ30 for the United
States, claiming jurisdiction over, among other things, the resources of the
21. Id. Art. 1.
22. Id.
23. See E. LUARD, THE CONTROL OF THE SEA-BED 21 (1977).
24. The continental margin is the whole area of the submerged portion of the continental crust. It
includes the continental shelf, continental slope, and continental rise.
25. For a discussion of the minerals found in the deep seabed and their strategic importance to the
United States, see E. LUARD, supra note 23, at 3-28.
26. See H.R. REP. 94-411 Part II at 26-38, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1650-52.
27. Act of June 28, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-283, 94 Stat. 553 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-73
(1982)). The DSHMRA enacted partly as a response to the breakdown of negotiations in UNCLOS III
over an international seabed regime. Companies were unlikely to invest heavily in developing seabed
resources unless they could be guaranteed a minimum time during which they could recover their
investment. Congress enacted the DSHMRA as an interim measure, to provide stability until such time
as the UNCLOS negotiations developed an acceptable regime. See DSHMRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1401.
28. Id. § 1403(2).
29. The DSHMRA defines hard minerals as "nodules which include one or more minerals, at least
one of which contains manganese, nickel, cobalt, or copper." Id. at § 1403(6).
30. Proclamation No. 5030, 48 Fed. Reg. 10,605 (1983).
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seabed. 31 The accompanying Oceans Policy Statement 32 declares that the
proclamation asserts a right belonging to the United States by virtue of
customary international law. The Policy Statement asserts that the United
Nations Convention on the law of the Sea provision that establishes a 200
mile minimum EEZ for all coastal states33 embodies prevailing customary
law. Regardless of whether the United States has a right to proclaim a 200
mile EEZ in international law, 34 the proclamation raises the question of
whether it, or the customary international law of the EEZ that it claims to
embrace, changes the domestic regime dividing jurisdiction between DOI
and NOAA.
II. THE AGENCIES' POSITIONS
DOI asserts that the definition of the Continental Shelf contained in the
OCSLA is a legal, not a geological, definition. 35 DOI notes that federal
courts look to international law when interpreting the definition of the
Continental Shelf, citing two Fifth Circuit cases holding that the terms of
the Shelf Convention supersede the OCSLA where they are incompati-
ble.36 From this DOI concludes that the extent of United States jurisdiction
31. The assertion of jurisdiction is probably inconsistent with the acknowledgment of state
jurisdiction in the Shelf Convention: It does not rely on an exploitability test and it departs from the
legal concept of jurisdiction of a submerged area that is part of the coastal state's land mass. See infra
Part IIIB.
32. Oceans Policy Statement, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 383 (March 14, 1983).
33. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10. 1982.
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122, reprinted in 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
LOS Convention]. Article 56 of the LOS Convention gives coastal states the sovereign right to explore
and exploit the living and nonliving natural resources in the seabed and waters within 200 miles of their
coast.
34. President Reagan refused to sign the LOS Convention and therefore the United States should
neither have to abide by its terms nor benefit by the rights it confers. Nevertheless, most authorities
agree that a coastal state's right to a 200-mile EEZ has become customary international law. See. e.g.,
The Continental Shelf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) 1982 I.C.J. 18, 74 (Judgment of Feb. 24.
1982): RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 514 (Tent. Draft No. 2).
reporter's note a (1983); Gamble & Frankowska, The 1982 Convention and Customary Law of the Sea:
Observations, a Framework, anda Warning, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 491,501 (1984); Grolin, The Future
of the Law of the Sea: Consequences of a Non-Treaty or Non-Universal Treats, Situation, 13 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L L. 1, 8-9 (1983); Comment, Fisher' and Economic Zones as Customary International
Lat, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 661 (1980); Note, The United States' Claims of Customnary Legal Rights
Under the Law of the Sea Convention, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 253, 272 (1984). The United States
probably has the right in international law to assert such a zone although it is not a party to the LOS
Convention.
35. Letter from J.J. Simmons, supra note 6 (citing Treasure Salvors, Inc. v. Unidentified Wrecked
and Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 569 F.2d 330, 338 n. 14 (5th Cir. 1978)).
36. Id. (citing Treasure Salvors, 569 F.2d at 340, and United States v. Ray, 423 F. 2d 16, 21 (5th Cir.
1970)).
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over submerged land is determined by reference to international law,37 and
the President's EEZ proclamation and newly evolved customary interna-
tional law provide a new definition of the Continental Shelf. That new
definition sets the minimum extension of the Continental Shelf at 200
nautical miles from the baseline of the coast. 38Because the definition of the
Continental Shelf contained in the OCSLA is informed by international
law, DOI asserts that by virtue of current international law its jurisdiction
extends at least 200 miles into the ocean. 39
NOAA counters this argument40 by pointing out that even though the
President's proclamation may be effective in international law, an executive
declaration cannot change domestic law. NOAA finds that domestic law is
controlled by the 1958 Shelf Convention, as the most recent congressional
expression of the extent of United States jurisdiction. Moreover, DOI's
interpretation of the presidential proclamation as extending DOI's author-
ity beyond the Continental Shelf as defined by Congress in the DSHMRA,
would allow an encroachment of NOAA's authority. NOAA further points
to pending legislation to implement the presidential proclamation 41 as
evidence of the necessity for implementing legislation. Although NOAA
does not have authority regarding sulfides, a general extension of DOI's
authority over the EEZ would encroach upon NOAA's authority in the deep
seabed regarding hard minerals and any potential authority Congress might
later give NOAA regarding sulfides.
37. It does not appear to be DOI's position that newly evolved customary international law
supersedes either existing legislation or the 1958 Shelf Convention. Rather, DOI appears to argue that
Congress purposely left the definition of the Continental Shelf vague in the OCSLA, intending that the
precise limits would be established by reference to international law. DOI perhaps does not view the
definition of the Continental Shelf in the Shelf Convention as limiting its assertion of authority out to
200 miles. This may be because DOI has long viewed that definition as ambulatory, limited only by the
test of exploitability. In a previous situation DOI asserted that it had authority over a submarine ridge
separated from the main continental area by a deep canyon. Rather than analyze whether the area was a
part of the continental shelf, DOI asserted that because the area was exploitable, it lay within the area
defined by the Shelf Convention. Opinion of the Associate Solicitor of the United States Department of
Interior M-36615, reprinted in GoWER, FED. SE~v.-CownqEn a. SrEU, OCS 1961-25.
38. Letter from J.J. Simmons, supra note 6, at 3. The LOS Convention, supra note 33, art. 76,
defines the Continental Shelf as an area a minimum of 200 miles from the coast, and has a complex
formula for calculating shelf areas beyond 200 miles. This new definition has not become customary
international law. DOI's argument is therefore flawed because the EEZ and the Continental Shelf are not
the same thing.
39. Letter from J.J. Simmons, supra note 6, at 3.
40. NOAA's position and analysis are set out in General Counsel Memo, supra note 5.
41. H.R. 2061, 98th Cong., 1st Seass. (1983) (a bill to implement an EEZ for the United States).
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III. THE STATUTORY SCHEME AND THE SHELF CONVENTION
The OCSLA defines the Continental Shelf only vaguely, and some
writers have argued that Congress intended to create a regime under the Act
that is coterminous with United States jurisdiction as allowed by interna-
tional law.42 The legislative history and the Act itself do not clearly support
this assertion. Nor does the OCSLA appear to delegate to the executive the
authority to extend the geographical scope of its application. In addition,
the Shelf Convention may limit United States jurisdiction. If either the Act
or the Convention places a seaward limit on the Act's operation, the
question arises whether newly evolved customary international law or a
presidential proclamation can override a prior inconsistent statute or treaty.
The extent of the statutory and treaty schemes are explored in this Part, as
well as the contention that the presidential proclamation does not operate to
change either scheme. The next Part explores what effect customary
international law has on domestic law in this context.
A. The Extent of Jurisdiction Under the OCSLA
Congress did not include the geological definition of the continental
shelf in the OCSLA. Congress may purposely have left the definition vague
so that the Act would adapt to developing international concepts regarding
the Continental Shelf doctrine. Yet even though Congress may have in-
tended the operation of the Act to be at least partially ambulatory, several
factors strongly suggest that Congress did recognize some geographical
limit to the regime it was creating.
When President Truman proclaimed the right of the United States to the
resources of the continental shelf, he was exercising the power of the
executive to assert sovereign rights in the international forum and to
participate in forming customary international law. President Truman
made legal arguments to support his claim, most notably that such an
exercise of jurisdiction was justified by geological reality: "the continental
shelf may be regarded as an extension of the land mass of the coastal nation
and thus naturally appurtenant to it." 43
42. See, e.g., Kreuger, Management of Federal Petroleum Resources in the United States, 27 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 61, 69 (1978); Stone, Legal Aspects of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations, 8 NAT'L RES. J.
478, 485-92 (1968).
43. Proc. No. 2667, supra note 10. This concept ultimately formed the justification for the doctrine
of the Continental Shelf accepted by the international community. See North Sea Continental Shelf
(Fed. Rep. Germ./Denmark; Fed. Rep. Germ./Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Feb. 20, 1969),
where the International Court of Justice declared that "the rights of the coastal State in respect of the
area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea
exist ipsofacto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land." Id. at para. 19.
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The OCSLA defines the Continental Shelf as submerged areas that
"appertain to the United States. "44 Congress likely intended to incorporate
the geological concept embraced by President Truman when it chose this
language, which closely tracks his press release. Moreover, Congress
indicated when it passed the Act that it was aware of the geological
definition of the continental shelf.45 The Report of the Senate Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs provided a geological definition. 46 The Report
also quoted testimony given before Congress by the Secretary of the
Interior who described the seaward extent in miles, and the total area in
square miles, of the continental shelf.47 This indicates that Congress relied
on a clear statement of the limit to the area it was regulating.
Another piece of evidence supporting the view that the statute is am-
bulatory only within geological limits is that Congress passed the OCSLA
to implement President Truman's proclamation.48 It seems likely that
Congress intended the legislation to be coterminous with the proclamation.
This does not mean, however, that Congress intended to establish a regime
that was coterminous with state jurisdiction recognized by international
law.
Finally, Congress used the term "Continental Shelf" in the legislation,
tying the legal concept at least loosely to the geological concept of the same
name. Moreover, Congress limited the definition to submerged lands that
"appertain" to the United States. Because this language tracks that of
Truman's proclamation, it must apply to the area claimed by the proclama-
tion-the submerged portion of the land mass.
44. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a).
45. Although Congress could rely on a generally accepted definition of the Continental Shelf, it is
also possible that Congress did not include that definition in the Act because the precise edge of the
continental shelf may vary depending upon geological features. The LOS Convention contains a
definition of the Continental Shelf that includes a complex formula for determining the geographical
edge of the shelf area a coastal state may claim. LOS Convention, supra note 33, art. 76. The
complexity of the calculation for defining that edge indicates the difficulty of describing a precise
geographic limit to the continental shelf.
46. S. REP. No. 441, supra note 11, at4(1953); see also H.R. Rep. No. 43, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1953), reprinted in 1953 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws 2178.
47. S. REP. No. 441, supra note 7, at 4 (quoting Hearings on S. 923 and Related Measures Before
the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 81st Cong. 65 (1949)).
48. President Truman in his press release anticipated congressional implementation to prescribe
which shelf areas would be allocated to the states and which left to federal control. Press Release dated
Sept. 28, 1945, supra note 12.
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B. The Shelf Convention
The Constitution declares that a treaty made by the President and Senate
as provided in the Constitution4 9 is the supreme law of the land. 50 Because
both treaties and congressional legislation are the supreme law of the land,
the Supreme Court has held that the later in time principle applies as
between them. 5 1 Thus a treaty that is inconsistent with a prior statute
overrides the statute to the extent that they are inconsistent. 52 Before a
treaty provision will override a prior statute, the provision must have effect
domestically, or be self-executing. 53 Thus if the definition of the Continen-
tal Shelf in the 1958 Shelf Convention is self-executing, it provides the
controlling definition for domestic purposes. To the extent that the defini-
tion in the Shelf Convention is more limited than the definition in the
OCSLA, the OCSLA is limited. 54
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has declared that the Shelf Conven-
tion "superseded any incompatible terminology in the domestic statute. "55
Although the Fifth Circuit did not analyze the question of whether the Shelf
Convention is self-executing, its conclusion seems justified. A treaty term
is self-executing if it requires no legislation to implement it. 56 A treaty term
that establishes a limit to a state party's jurisdiction does not require
implementing legislation. 57 The Shelf Convention states that coastal state
rights do not depend upon any action by the coastal state. 58 The United
States apparently viewed the Convention as essentially declaratory of
existing law and therefore not requiring implementing legislation. 59
49. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
50. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
51. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
52. Similarly, the courts will give effect to an act of Congress that is inconsistent with a prior treaty,
even if it results in a violation of international law. See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580. 599
(1884).
53. Foster v. Nielson, 7 U.S. (2 Pet.) 415 (1829).
54. It is also possible that even if the Shelf Convention does not limit the definition of the
Continental Shelf in the OCSLA, subsequent legislation does. If the definition in the OCSLA is vague,
its meaning might be supplied by subsequent acts of Congress defining the same term. Legislation
subsequent to the OCSLA defines the Continental Shelf in the same words as the Convention. See
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON OCEANS AND ATMOSPHERE, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE OF
THE UNITED STATES: SOME IMMEDIATE POLICY ISSUES, app. E (May 1984).
55. TreasureSalvors, 569 F.2d 330,340(5th Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Ray. 423 F.2d 16,
21 (5th Cir. 1970).
56. Foster v. Nielson, 7 U.S. (2 Pet.) 415 (1829); see also Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102.
118-19 (1932).
57. But see United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979). in
which the Fifth Circuit held that the contemporaneous treaty on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, limiting coastal state jurisdiction for some purposes to twelve miles, was not self-executing. That
decision has been widely criticized. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 671 F.2d 46, 50 (lst Cir. 1982).
58. Shelf Convention, supra note 20.
59. See Conventions on the Law of the Sea: Hearings on Executives JK,LM,N Before the Senate
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If the definition of the Continental Shelf in the Shelf Convention is
domestically controlling, it is necessary to determine the extent of coastal
state jurisdiction recognized by that definition. The definition is in some
respects ambulatory because it incorporates the element of exploitability,
implying that the seaward edge of a state's jurisdiction will expand as
technology progresses. Commentators agree, nevertheless, that there is a
seaward limit inherent in the complete definition. 60 Decisions of the Inter-
national Court of Justice (ICJ) also support the contention that there is
some limit, and there is evidence in the language of the definition and the
history of its drafting to support this reading.
In 1969 the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, and the
Netherlands asked the ICJ to decide what principles and rules of law
applied to boundary disputes over the North Sea continental shelf.61 The
Court concluded that the governing principle was that the continental shelf
constitutes the natural prolongation of the state's land territory into the
sea.62 Therefore, the Court stated, the parties were to delimit the boundary
that would give each one the part of the continental shelf that constituted the
"natural prolongation of its land territory" so long as it did not encroach
upon the natural prolongation of another state's land territory. 63 If the
application of this principle created areas of overlapping jurisdiction, the
parties were to consider the configuration of coastlines, physical and
geological structure of the shelf, and the degree of proportionality in
accordance with equitable principles.64 The Court declared that if a sub-
merged area does not constitute a "natural" extension of the land territory,
then "it cannot be regarded as appertaining to that State." 65
The Court appeared to retreat somewhat from this principle in the 1982
Continental Shelf case.66 The Court rejected Libya's argument that once the
area of natural prolongation is determined, equitable principles are satis-
fied. 67 Instead, the Court elevated the satisfaction of equitable principles to
a plane above the determination of the area of natural prolongation. 68 The
Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1960) (testimony from the State Department
that the Conventions did not conflict with existing legislation).
60. See D. O'CoNNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 492-94 (1982); R. OGLEY, INTERNA-
TIONALIZING THE SEABED 105-06 (1984); Stone, supra note 42, at 494-96.
61. North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of
Germany/Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Feb. 20, 1969).
62. Id. at para. 43.
63. Id. at para. 101.
64. Id.
65. Id. at para. 43.
66. Concerning the Continental Shetf (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982 I.C.J. 18 (Judgment
of Feb. 24, 1982).




Court should not be read, however, as having rejected the principle of
natural prolongation; rather, it found that because the submerged area in
controversy constituted a single continental shelf, the principle of pro-
longation was insufficient to delimit each state's shelf area. 69 In explaining
and distinguishing its holding in the North Sea case, the Court acknowl-
edged that the concept of natural prolongation is still relevant, even if it may
not be sufficient to determine the boundary between adjoining states. 70 The
implication is that natural prolongation as the legal justification for the
Continental Shelf doctrine is determinative when it is sufficient to delimit a
submerged area. 7 1
Further evidence that the Shelf Convention limits the seaward extent of
coastal state jurisdiction exists in the history and wording of the Con-
vention. The International Law Commission submitted draft articles on the
high seas convention as well as the Shelf Convention. In its commentary to
the draft, the Commission listed high seas freedoms but noted that its list
was not meant to be exclusive. 72 The Commission stated that it did not
mention "the freedom to explore or exploit the subsoil of the high seas"
because such activity, off the continental shelf, was not of sufficient
practical importance to justify regulation. 73 This indicates that the Com-
mission viewed the seabed outside continental shelf areas as part of the high
seas and therefore not susceptible to a claim of jurisdiction by any state.
The final evidence of limitation is the definition of continental shelf used
in the Convention. The definition refers to "submarine areas adjacent to the
coast." 74 Although "adjacent" is not defined, this terminology appears to
qualify the definition that follows, which includes the exploitability test. 75
Read as a whole, the definition limits the area to those submerged continen-
tal shelf lands that are adjacent to the state's coast.
69. Id. at Finding 3.
70. Id. at para. 43 ("The concept of natural prolongation thus was and remains a concept to be
examined within the context of customary law and State practice."); id. at para. 44 ("identification of
natural prolongation may, where the geographical circumstances are appropriate, have an important
role to play . . . in view of its significance as the justification of Continental Shelf rights").
71. It is unclear how the EEZ doctrine will modify the Continental Shelf doctrine in customary law.
Insofar as the operative definition of the Continental Shelf in domestic law derives from the Shelf
Convention, however, it should not make a difference that international legal rights based on customary
law are evolving.
72. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, I I U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 9) at 24, U.N. Doc A/3159 (1956).
73. Id. See Stone, supra note 42, at 494-96.
74. Shelf Convention, supra note 20.
75. See Stone, supra note 42, at 495-96.
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C. The President's Proclamation
Although the President asserts rights for the United States in the interna-
tional forum, the President may make domestic law only in very limited
circumstances. Courts recognize the President's power to take action that is
essentially legislative when Congress has delegated such power 76 or when
the President acts pursuant to foreign affairs powers explicitly granted in
the Constitution. In the latter case courts are more likely to uphold a
particular action when Presidents have traditionally taken such action and
Congress has traditionally acquiesced or approved.
None of these circumstances are present to justify an interpretation of the
EEZ proclamation that would alter existing domestic legislation. First,
Congress appears not to have delegated to the executive the power to extend
the jurisdiction of DOI. In the 1978 amendments to the OCSLA, Congress
gave the President the authority to establish procedures for settling bound-
ary disputes regarding the Continental Shelf.77 The legislative history
clearly indicates that this power was directed at outstanding disputes with
Canada. 78 Moreover, the power was to be exercised within a given time. 79
The language of the statute itself speaks of boundary disputes and therefore
appears to provide authority over adjoining boundaries rather than those
between United States jurisdiction and the deep seabed.
Second, President Reagan's EEZ proclamation is not ancillary to an
independent foreign affairs power of the executive. 80 kn attempt by the
President to extend jurisdiction over new submerged areas is not closely
76. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-20 (1936)
(upholding Congress' delegation to the President of power to declare and enforce an arms embargo
because of the importance to international relations).
77. Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 203(b), 92 Stat. 635 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(B) (1982)).
78. See H.R. REP. No. 95-590 128-29, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONo.
& AD. NEws 1534-35.
79. 43 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2)(B) states that the President shall establish such procedures "[w]ithin
one year after September 18, 1978."
80. For example, in Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952), the Court recognized that the
President could establish courts in occupied territory to try civilians, although Congress had estab-
lished an alternative system. The Court found that the President had the power to make law in occupied
territory because of the emergency of war and as an adjunct to the express power granted by the
Constitution as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Id. at 348 ("The President has the urgent and
infinite responsibility not only of combating the enemy but of governing any territory occupied by the
United States by force of arms."). The Court also noted that Congress had expressly recognized the
jurisdiction of the executive's occupation courts and had not attempted to limit the President's power in
this respect. Id. at 350-52. See also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), and United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), discussed infra notes 120-25 and accompanying text, upholding a
presidential agreement based on the executive's constitutional power to recognize foreign governments.
Washington Law Review
related to one of the President's enumerated foreign affairs powers. 8' Even
though the President might occupy and govern enemy territory in a state of
war, the Supreme Court has held that only an act of Congress or a treaty can
annex territory to the United States. 82
Moreover, there is no history of Presidents acquiring and governing
submarine areas with congressional acquiescence. 83 President Truman, in
the press release accompanying his Continental Shelf proclamation, stated
that he was asserting rights of the United States in the international forum,
but leaving to Congress the matter of creating a regime for the area over
which he was asserting rights. 84 President Reagan's EEZ proclamation
asserted rights over important new resources in essentially new territory;
the argument from precedent indicates that it is left to Congress to establish
the laws for developing those resources.
The proclamation itself also does not support the interpretation that it is a
legislative act. First, the proclamation states that it does not change existing
law. Under existing law embodied in the DSHMRA, NOAA alone has the
authority to regulate the activity of United States citizens regarding man-
ganese nodules in the deep seabed. 85 The EEZ proclamation therefore
would be internally inconsistent if read to extend DOI's jurisdiction.
Second, the proclamation states that it asserts rights over important new
resources. The President therefore recognized that he was asserting rights
over territory outside of existing United States jurisdiction.
81. Compare Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) (President's express power as commander-
in-chief of the armed forces) with United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (President's express power
to recognize foreign governments) and United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) (same).
82. Fleming v. Page, 18 U.S. (9 How.) 278 (1850). The President's assertion ofjurisdiction over the
subsoil and seabed beyond the continental shelf fall short of "annexation"; nevertheless, like annexa-
tion it has the effect of acquiring rights over territory and creating a need for laws and regulations to
govern that territory.
83. Compare Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680 (1981) (history of congressional
acquiescence supports President's power to make claims settlements with foreign governments) with
Madsen, 343 U.S. at 350-52 (history of congressional acquiescence supports President's power to
establish occupation courts).
84. Press Release dated Sept. 28, 1945, supra note 12.
85. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. The President's proclamation is not necessarily
contrary to the spirit of the DSHMRA because that Act gives NOAA authority over citizens operating in
the deep seabed, not over the seabed itself. The Act defines seabed as that area seaward of "the
Continental Shelf of any nation; and . . . any area of national [sic] resource jurisdiction of any foreign
nation." 30 U.S.C. § 1403(4)(A) & (B) (1982). The Act thus gives NOAA authority over United States
citizens in areas outside of any state's jurisdiction. If the United States recognizes another state's
extension of its jurisdiction, then NOAA's authority is arguably diminished. As it is the President who
would recognize another state's extension of jurisdiction, one might argue that the President may
likewise diminish NOAA's authority by proclaiming an extension of United States jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, because President Reagan's proclamation states that it does not affect existing law, it
should be narrowly construed.
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One final piece of judicial evidence weighs against interpreting the EEZ
proclamation to incorporate new maritime territory into the existing legis-
lative regime. In Justheim v. McKay, 8 6 plaintiffs were oil companies whom
DOI had denied leases on the continental shelf. Some of their applications
had been made after Truman's proclamation, but all were before the
OCSLA. Plaintiffs asked the court to declare that the Interior Department
must grant the leases because the submerged areas were "public lands"
within the meaning of the Mineral Lands Act. 87 Instead, the court exam-
ined the legislative background of the Act and found that Congress did not
intend "public lands" to include submerged lands of the continental
shelf.88 The court in Justheim thus did not recognize Truman's proclama-
tion as affecting domestic law involving DOI's authority to lease minerals.
IV. THE IMPACT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ON
THE STATUTORY SCHEME-IS SUPREME LAW EQUAL
LAW?
A final argument that can be inferred from DOI's reasoning is that the
new customary international law of the EEZ overrides existing domestic
law. Professor Henkin supports this position in a recent article, in which he
argues that newly evolved customary international law should be construed
to override existing domestic law.89 Professor Henkin's argument is that
customary international law is federal law, as are treaties, acts of Congress,
and federal common law. Professor Henkin concludes that all federal law is
of equal stature because of Supreme Court holdings that later inconsistent
treaties prevail over statutes. 90 Therefore, Professor Henkin argues, the
latest in time rule should apply to customary international law as well. 91
The fact that courts have held that treaties are equal to acts of Congress
does not compel the conclusion that customary international law is equal to
an act of Congress or to a treaty. Professor Henkin's conclusion is not
supported by the Constitution, nor by the relationship of international law
86. 229 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
87. 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 181-287 (1982)).
88. 229 F.2d at 31 ("Congress did not intend to apply the. . . Act to lands under the marginal seas
where problems of survey and administration would be wholly different").
89. Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555 (1984).
Professor Henkin suggests that customary law may "effectively modify" the OCSLA "and numerous
statutes that refer to waters under U.S. jurisdiction, which are now substantially extended." Id. at 1564
n.34. Professor Henkin's view is refuted in Goldklang, Back on Board the Paquete Habana: Resolving
the Conflict Between Statutes and Customary International Law, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 143 (1984).
90. Henkin, supra note 89, at 1564. The traditional common law rule of deference to the
legislature, however, prevents the courts from superseding prior acts of Congress by making inconsis-
tent common law. Id. at 1563.
91. Id.
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to federal common law. It is moreover contrary to the principle of separa-
tion of powers and the prohibition on presidential legislation. Finally,
particularly in the case of the EEZ, there are strong policy reasons against
interpreting customary international law as extending the domestic regime
governing seabed resources.
A. Customary International Law Contrasted with Treaties
As between treaties and statutes, the later in time rule applies because
both are the supreme law of the land. 92 Professor Henkin argues that there
should be no difference in this respect between customary international law
and treaties. 93 But there are important differences between treaties and
customary law that argue for different treatment of the two in domestic law.
First, the Constitution declares a treaty supreme, but mentions the "law
of nations" only with respect to Congress defining and punishing piracies
and crimes against the law of nations. More importantly, a treaty is made by
the President with the consent of two-thirds of the Senate. Because of the
participation of one house of Congress, a treaty is akin to a legislative act.
But in forming customary international law, the President's role is pri-
mary;9 4 the legislature need not act at all. The conclusion that a treaty may
supersede an earlier legislative act is justified on two grounds: first, the
Constitution declares treaties supreme, and second, two-thirds of the
Senate participates in its making. Neither ground supports the proposition
that customary international law may supersede domestic legislation.
B. The Relation of Customary International Law to Federal Common
Law
That "international law is part of our law" is a familiar phrase, invoked
but not elaborated upon by the modern Court. 95 Professor Henkin relies on
this concept to argue that international law is federal common law, or like
federal common law, and therefore supreme.96 But this argument ignores
92. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
93. Henkin, supra note 89. at 1565 ("There seems to be no authority in jurisprudence, nor any
reason in principle, for giving customary law less weight than a treaty in relation to an earlier act of
Congress. ").
94. Professor Henkin acknowledges that "it is the executive branch ... that acts for the United
States to help legislate customary international law." Henkin, supra note 89. at 1562.
95. See. e.g., First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio Exterior de Cuba. 103 S.Ct.
2591, 2598 (1983) (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)).
96. Henkin, supra note 90. at 1557-61. Although federal courts will not supersede federal statutes
with common law, see, e.g.. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304.312-13 (198 1), federal common law is
supreme over state law. See, e.g.. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 378 U.S. 398 (1964).
discussed infra note 106.
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the eighteenth century origins of this concept.
To eighteenth century jurists and lawyers, international law was a part of
the general common law, to be administered by state courts and federal
courts alike. 97 Notions about the common law process and the role of
federal courts in administering the common law have changed dramatically
in the last two centuries. To appreciate the role customary international law
does or should play in federal courts, it is useful to examine eighteenth
century conceptions of the general common law, and the extent to which
those conceptions can or should influence modern jurisprudence. There are
essentially two views of the general common law applied by the early
federal courts: the organic view and the positivist view. 98 Professor Henkin
takes the organic concept that international law is part of federal common
law, then grafts the positivist argument onto that-international law is part
of our law, but it is not like common law because it is not judge made;
therefore, the common law tradition of judicial deference should not apply.
A proper analysis of the impact of customary international law on domestic
law must separate the organic from the positivist view, however, to see the
implications of each for the problem.
1. The Organic View
Eighteenth century jurists viewed the common law as not just a unified
body of rules, but as a process of applying rules to a specific conflict
between identifiable parties. 99 It was seen as a customary system, designed
97. See generally Dickinson, The Law ofNations as Part of the National Law of the United States,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 26 (1952) Pt. 1; Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary
Act of.1789: The Example ofMarine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513 (1984). The general common law
was considered to include merchant law, maritime and admiralty law, conflicts of law, and what is today
considered public international law.
In the eighteenth century, individuals were viewed as much the proper subjects of international law as
were states. See Dickinson, supra, at 27. Thus commercial dealings between citizens of different
nations were decided upon principles of international law existing within the general common law and
administered by federal and state courts. Dealings between individuals and nations were also decided
upon international law principles.
Because there was one general common law that could be administered by state and federal courts
alike, there was no concept of a supreme federal common law. It was only later, when controversy over
the extent of federal power developed, that common law was viewed as state or federal, with federal
common law supreme in those areas where it existed.
98. The term "organic" is not generally used in the literature, but it captures the sense of this view.
For a thorough exposition of the organic view, see R. BRIDWELL & R. WHrrrEN, THE CoNsTrrION AND
THE COMMON LAW (1977). For the classic statement of the positivist view, see Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 378, 332-34 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting) (there is no body of general common law; "law in the sense in which courts speak of it today
does not exist without some definite authority behind it").
99. The organic view summarized here is derived primarily from R. BRIDWELL & R. WnrrrEN,
supra note 98. Citations to early authorities are given where appropriate.
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to give judicial recognition to the legitimate expectations of parties to a
controversy, based upon custom and usage. Under this system, judicial
decisions were not seen as the law, but only as evidence of the law. 100 The
system acknowledged that custom and usage might change from one
location to another, and that giving effect to the intentions of the parties
might require a court to apply a local rule that varied from the general
rule. 101
Thus in the absence of a "fixed and permanent" local rule controlling a
transaction, a court would apply the general common law, which included
principles of the law of nations. But when a local customary rule clearly
existed, which controlled the controversy under conflicts of law principles,
the courts would apply that local rule to the controversy. 102 This was so both
in the case of state local rules and American local rules.' 0 3 A local rule
could be established either by decisions of the local court, or by statutory
enactment. 104
100. This view is expressed in Swift v. Tyson, 10 U.S. (16 Pet.) 865, 871 (1842). See also I F.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY 94-95(1973) (discussing the role of the judge in a customary
law system); S.G. TUCKER, COMNIMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA 22 (Winchester 1836).
101. See S.G. TUCKER. supra note 100. at 26 (ler loci contractus applies to give effect to intentions
of parties when they entered contract); see also Brown v. Van Braam, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 629 (1797)
(applying Rhode Island law to a case involving a note made between Rhode Island residents in Rhode
Island and later negotiated to a foreign citizen); see generally J. STORY, CONIIENTARIES ON THE
CONFLICTS OF LAWs 21-39 (8th ed. 1883). Under the organic view, the Judiciary Act of 1789 § 34
embodied the lex loci principle, rather than the principle, later adopted in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938), that state common law per se was something different from a general common law.
102. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900) (international law applies only in absence
of controlling municipal law) (emphasis added); R. BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, supra note 98, at 78-87
(discussing the application of conflicts of law principles to disputes arising from commercial transac-
tions): see also J. STORY, supra note 101, at 21-39.
103. See The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 654, 661-62 (1875) (disregarding international
customary law in the matter of a maritime lien because the Supreme Court had previously recognized a
different rule): Tag v. Rogers, 267 F.2d 664, 666 (D.C. Cir. 1959) ("it has long been settled in the
United States that the federal courts are bound to recognize any one of these three sources of law
[treaties, statutes, and the Constitution] as superior to canons of international law"), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 904 (1960): see also Fletcher, supra note 97. at 1520 (by the 1820's "American lawyers began to
speak fairly regularly of a distinctly American law merchant, different in significant respects from the
international law merchant"). Compare Brown v. Van Braam, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 629 (1797) (Rhode
Island law applies to foreign plaintiffwhen note sued on made between Rhode Island citizens in Rhode
Island) with Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 28 F. Cas. 1062 (C.C.D.R.I. 1812) (No. 16,871) (Rhode Island
discharge of insolvent does not apply to a foreign plaintiff when instrument sued on made in a foreign
country whose laws do not recognize such a discharge), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Clark v. Van
Reimsdyk, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 688 (1815).
104. A local rule of law, however, could not have extraterritorial effect. For example, in a prize case
the court relied on international prize law in disregard of a federal statute because the statute could not
control a transaction that occurred in a British port. The Sally, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 579 (1814). Justice
Story reasoned that "the municipal forfeiture under the Non-intercourse Act, was absorbed in the more
general operation of the law of war. The property of an enemy seems hardly to be within the purview of
mere municipal regulations; but is confiscable under the jus gentium." Id. at 384.
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It is difficult to overlay the organic view of the general common law with
its conflicts of law principles on the operation of federal courts today.
Federal courts no longer apply general common law. 105 Rather, they apply
state common law when sitting in diversity cases, or an extremely limited
variety of federal common law, which apparently includes international
law. 106 Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that the principles of the organic
system regarding the relationship between customary norms and local
statutes still have some relevance in the area of international law. 107
In the organic view of common law, where a clear municipal rule exists,
and where that rule governs under conflicts principles, the case should be
decided based upon the municipal rule. It should make no difference that
there is a later conflicting customary law principle. 108 Thus international
105. Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) (Supreme Court is not a general common law
court with power to develop and apply its own rules of decision).
106. This appears to be the implication of the Supreme Court's decision in Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 378 U.S. 398 (1964), in which the Court held that the Act of State doctrine
prohibited United States courts from disregarding property ownership based upon the expropriation
decree of a foreign sovereign. The Court stated that because ordering relations between the United
States and other members of the international community is exclusively an aspect of federal law, only
the federal judiciary could decide whether the Act of State doctrine applied to a particular case, and that
decision would bind the states. Id. at 425; see also Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (foreign
policy is area of exclusive federal power); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNrrED STATES § 131, comment d (Tent. Draft No. 5) (customary international law is federal law,
supreme over state law) [hereinafter cited as DRAFT RESTATEMENT].
107. This Comment is concerned only with the question of whether a customary international law
principle can override an act of the legislature. A broader question, not addressed here, is what role
customary international law should play in the absence of controlling domestic law. The issue has
generated controversy in the field of human rights litigation. Recently human rights advocates have
argued that customary international law proscribing human rights abuses affects the domestic law of the
United States. They may argue that human rights norms are substantive domestic law, or that they
inform the interpretation of "cruel or unusual punishment" in the eighth amendment. See Hartman,
"Unusual" Punishment: the Domestic Effects of International Norms Restricting the Application of the
Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655 (1983).
For a case relying on international human rights norms to order release of a detained alien, see
Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D.Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th
Cir. 1981). For a discussion of human rights cases in general, see Comment, The Domestic Application
ofInternational HumanRightsLaw:EvolvingSpecies, 5 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 161 (1981). For
a discussion of conflicts of law principles regarding the human rights issue, see infra note 109.
108. Such a notion may raise the objections of those who have long since rejected the dualist
conception of municipal and international law. See Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of
International law in the Federal Courts of the United States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1932). What is
suggested here is not a notion of our law, and a separate body of international law from which our law
"borrows." Rather, it is an acknowledgment that under an organic view of customary law, conflicts of
law principles may require that the lex loci control a given controversy. The locale may be the nation, or
it may be the state, when federal interests are not implicated. See, e.g., Abdul-Ruhman Omar Adra v.
Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 886 (D.Md. 1961) (Lebanese custody decree not given effect, court implicitly
used conflicts of law principles to determine that Maryland law governed child in the state). Customary
international law, like eighteenth century general common law, is the "brooding omnipresence" that
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law should govern only in a case where there is no applicable municipal
law, or where municipal law does not govern either because it has no
extraterritorial effect or no effect with respect to the parties. 109 In the case
of the United States' Continental Shelf, the relevant conflicts of law
principle is that a state's laws have complete authority over all real property
within its territory. 11 Thus the extent of the United States' Continental
Shelf should clearly be determined by the law of the United States and not
the law of nations.
supplies the general rule when no local rule or treaty controls.
This is not to say that federal courts are free to select from among international law principles those
that they wish to apply. In the organic system there are well-established rules for determining, first.
whether a local rule exists and, second, whether the local rule should govern the controversy. See R.
BRIDWELL & R. WHITTEN, supra note 98, at 68-87. In a case in which there is no controlling local rule.
and no law of a foreign jurisdiction governs, then principles of international law should apply. A
decision by Justice Story while on circuit demonstrates this system. In United States v. The Schooner
La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551), the question was whether a ship
should be forfeited, having been seized while engaged in slave trade. Justice Story noted that the
African slave trade was inconsistent with the law of nations and engagement in such trade rendered a
vessel confiscable, unless municipal law of the vessel's flag state approved of the trade. Thus Justice
Story examined French law because the vessel sailed under the French flag. As French law was not
contrary to the law of nations on this point, Justice Story found the vessel confiscable and ordered that it
be delivered to the French government.
109. The difficulty with this analysis is that in each case the court must determine whether a given
municipal law will control. For example, traditional conflicts of law principles recognize that a state has
absolute authority over property and persons within its territory. But when a question arises that
implicates the rights of a foreigner, municipal law will not automatically apply, presumably even if the
foreigner is present in the United States. See, e.g.. The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 654. 661-62
(1875) ('[In each country, peculiarities exist ... on the outside boundaries of the law, where it...
affects only its own merchants or people in their relations to each other. Whereas, in matters affecting
the stranger or foreigner, the commonly received law of the whole commercial world is more
assiduously observed, as, in justice, it should be.").
If one applies traditional conflicts principles in the human rights context, see supra note 107,
different results might apply depending upon the context. For example, an illegal alien detained under
United States immigration laws might complain that arbitrary detention violates international human
rights norms. See Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), aff'd on other grounds,
634 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981). Although the United States might argue that a sovereign has absolute
control over immigration matters, see, e.g., The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889), the
alien might counter that arbitrary detention is not strictly related to a nation's decision over whom to
allow inside its borders. The alien's status as a foreigner might dictate treatment under an international
norm. Cf The Lottawanma, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 654, 661-62 (1875).
A United States citizen relying on international law to overcome a municipal law could not make a
similar argument. A United States citizen might argue that evolving international human rights laws
have wrought a fundamental change in conflicts of law principles. That is, a state's laws are binding on
all within its territory, except in those areas where the international community has determined that a
fundamental human right exists.
110. See J. STORY, supra note 101, at 21. This is not to say that United States courts do not apply
international law to resolve disputes over real property within United States territory. See, e.g., Jones v.
United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (holding that the United States could acquire new territory
because the law of nations recognised such a right). The point is that courts will apply municipal law
instead of international law when a controlling municipal law exists.
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2. The Positivist View
A second view of the common law tradition relies on the notion that all
law is made, and must proceed from some sovereign authority."11 The
positivist view suggests that early common law judges mistakenly believed
they discovered law by reference to the monolith of common law princi-
ples, but that modem judges recognize that they make law based upon their
view of wise social policy. 112 In the positivist scheme courts will not make
common law that supersedes a statute because the legislature is granted
sole legislative power and courts may only make law interstitially. 113 In the
positivist scheme, then, one might argue, as Professor Henkin does,114 that
because judges truly do "discover" international law it should supersede a
legislative act.
But this view is not true to its own underlying premise-that all law must
proceed from some authority. Customary international law would not be
law for the United States but for the acquiesence or participation of the
executive in its formation. 115 As such, the authority from which customary
international law proceeds, insofar as it applies to the United States, is the
executive. 116 Under such an analysis, one must examine the international
law principle as if it were an executive agreement. 117
111. See Black & White Taxi, 276 U.S. at 322-24, quoted supra note 98. The Supreme Court
accepted this view in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). Because the Constitution
confers no power on the federal courts to make common law for the states, the court held, federal courts
must follow the common law rule as announced by the highest state tribunal when sitting in diversity
actions.
112. See R. BRIDWELL &R. WHrrrEN, supra note 98, at 130-37. The modem Court thus makes law
when it disregards the expectations of the parties in favor of formulating wise social policy. See, e.g.,
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (Court disregarded Pennsylvania law
preventing recovery where there was forged indorsement because instrument was check issued by
United States government and uniform rule for such instruments is desirable).
113. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 218, 222 (1917) ("judges do and must
legislate but they can only do so interstitially") (Holmes, J., dissenting).
114. Henkin, supra note 89.
115. Under the doctrine of the persistent protester, a state can avoid becoming bound by a principle
of customary law by consistently objecting to it. See DRAFt RESTATEMENT, supra note 106, § 102
comment d.
116. Congress also participates in the formation of customary law, as it did, for example, when it
created a 200 mile fishery zone for the United States. Fishery Conservation Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1982)). In that instance, however, courts may
rely on the domestic statute for legal authority and need not turn to the international law principle.
117. If carried to the extreme such an analysis might dissolve into absurdities. It is helpful in
analyzing the problem here because the customary law in question is one of recent origin. It would seem
inappropriate to follow an ancient principle of customary law, long accepted and relied upon, only if it
comported with the requirements for domestic enforceability of a sole executive agreement.
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C. Customary International Law Viewed as a Sole Executive
Agreement
Although customary international law does not have the character of a
formal contract, the United States is bound by it to the same extent, because
of the element of opiniojuris in the formation of customary law. Thus the
United States is obligated under customary international law as much as it
is obligated under a treaty or executive agreement. 118 If customary interna-
tional law binding upon the United States proceeds from the authority of the
executive, those cases analyzing the President's power under sole executive
agreements shed light on the authority of customary law.
In two cases the Supreme Court has held that a sole executive agreement
superseded inconsistent state law. Both United States v. Pink 19 and United
States v. Belmont 20 involved the nationalization of Russian businesses by
the revolutionary government of Russia. Some of these businesses had
funds on deposit with a United States bank in New York. The President, in
recognizing the new government of the Soviet Union, negotiated an agree-
ment by which the Soviet Union assigned to the United States government
its interest in the funds in the New York bank. The United States govern-
ment then attempted to recover those funds.
In Belmont the Court held that the agreement prevailed over New York's
policy of avoiding confiscation decrees,' 21 and in Pink it held that the
agreement prevailed over a New York court decree awarding payment from
the funds to another party. 122 In these cases the Court maintained that
power over international relations is vested exclusively in the national
government and cannot be interfered with by the states. 123 So long as the
federal government was acting within the field of its powers, it could
consummate whatever act it undertook. The Court could not conceive that
any constitution, law, or policy of a state could be interposed as an obstacle
to the operation of a federal constitutional power, 124 here the constitutional
power of the President to recognize foreign governments. 125 The decision in
Belmont rests on principles of federalism: the primacy of the federal
government in the conduct of foreign affairs and the notion that "state lines
disappear" in international relations.
118. DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 106, § 102 commentj.
119. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
120. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
121. Id. at 330, 332.
122. 315 U.S. at 234.
123. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330, 332.
124. Id. at 331-32; see also Pink, 315 U.S. at 231 (enforcement of New York decree would
"subtract from the federal policy").
125. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330 ("We take judicial notice of the fact that coincident with the
assignment set forth in the complaint, the President recognized the Soviet Union.").
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Even though the Court in Belmont and Pink held a sole executive
agreement supreme over state law, it does not follow that an executive
agreement should supersede prior congressional legislation. In the leading
case addressing this issue, the Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Guy
W. Capps, Inc. 126 that a sole executive agreement between the President
and Canada would not take precedence over an act of Congress. The
Supreme Court reversed on other grounds. The question has not been
brought to the circuit courts of appeals since Guy W. Capps, and the
Restatement suggests that the issue is unsettled. 127
As a general proposition it does not seem contradictory to find that a sole
executive agreement supersedes state law but not congressional legislation.
The decisions in Belmont and Pink rested on concepts of national sov-
ereignty and grappled with the issue of federalism. The conflict was
between an act of an individual state and an act of the federal government in
an area affecting foreign relations. The Supreme Court upheld the act of the
federal government so long as it was a constitutional act of power. Because
the agreement with Russia was a valid act of power based on the President's
independent constitutional authority to recognize foreign governments, it
prevailed over state law. 128
Where a sole executive agreement contradicts prior congressional legis-
lation, the issue is not one of federalism but of separation of powers. If the
President concludes an agreement closely related to an independent consti-
tutional power, the authority of the agreement as law would seem stronger
than if it, arose out of the President's general implied foreign affairs
power. 129 In the recent case of Dames & Moore v. Regan 30 the Supreme
Court upheld President Carter's suspension of federal court cases against
126. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
127. DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 106, § 308 comment d. Two subsequent decisions have
adhered to the rule announced in Capps. Swearingen v. United States, 565 F. Supp. 1019 (D. Colo.
1983) (executive agreement cannot confer tax exemption on American employees in derogation of
Internal Revenue Code); Seery v. United States, 127 F Supp. 601 (Ct.Cl. 1955) (executive agreement
cannot bar remedy under fifth amendment), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 943 (1956).
128. The Restatement reporter appears to argue against the Guy W. Capps holding, citing the often
quoted passage from the Federalist Papers that "[aill Constitutional acts of power, whether in the
executive or the judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation as if they proceeded
from the legislature." DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 106, § 135 reporter's note 6. This argument
ignores the principle accepted by the Supreme Court that presidential acts of power have more authority
when carried out pursuant to a specific delegation of Congress, and less authority when contrary to a
congresssional expression. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring), discussed infra note 134. For a recent criticism of the Draft Restatement
position, see Dalton, International Agreements in the Revised Restatement, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 153,
159-63 (1985).
129. United States v. Guy W. Capps, 204 F.2d 655,660 (4th Cir. 1953), aff'd on other grounds,
348 U.S. 296 (1955).
130. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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Iran. The Court relied in part on the President's general foreign affairs
power, 131 but rested its decision primarily on the longstanding practice of
Presidents and the abundant evidence of congressional acquiescence and
approval. 132 The Court emphasized that its holding was narrow, and cau-
tioned against any broader construction of presidential power than neces-
sary. 133 The Court implied that in the face of congressional disapproval or a
contrary legislative act the case would have been far more difficult. 134
If sole executive agreements may be compared to the formation of
customary law principles, then the same analysis should apply. The Presi-
dent participates in the formation of customary law pursuant to the general
foreign affairs powers of the executive, and in the role as "sole organ" of the
sovereign. If federal courts gave domestic effect to customary international
law over a prior act of Congress, they would give effect essentially to
legislative acts of the executive. The Constitution gives neither the Presi-
dent nor the international community the authority to make domestic law.
The Executive may make domestic law only in narrow circumstances; it
would be difficult to argue that such a circumstance exists in the face of a
contradictory act of Congress 135 in an area outside the President's inde-
pendent constitutional powers and within Congress's express constitutional
powers.
D. Practical and Policy Considerations
There are also practical and policy arguments against giving customary
international law in general, and the customary law of the EEZ in par-
ticular, precedence over an act of Congress. Customary law works like
13 1. Id. at 682-83. The Court cited Pink and Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228. 231 (2d Cir.
195 1). Both cases relied on the President's power to recognize foreign governments, but in Dames &
Moore recognition was not an element in President Carter's claims settlement agreement with Iran.
132. 453 U.S. at 680 ("Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has implicitly
approved the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement.").
133. Id. at 688.
134. The Court was careful to restrict the scope of its holding. Id. In addition, the Court relied on
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Justice Frankfurter declared that the President's power was highest when exercised pursuant to explicit
congressional delegation, in the twilight zone in the absence of any congressional statement, and at its
lowest ebb when exercised contrary to the will of Congress. Id. at 637 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
135. The valid legislative act being considered here may be either the OCSLA or the Shelf
Convention. See supra Part IIIB. One might argue that because the Shelf Convention has been
superseded by customary law in the international forum, it should no longer be controlling domestic
law. Clearly the United States would no longer be bound in international law by the Convention to the
extent that it is superseded. But because the treaty is effective domestically, it has the same status in
domestic law as a statute. There is no reason to treat it any differently than a statute that has fallen out of
step with newly evolved customary law. Even assuming the treaty is no longer domestically effective.
the OCSLA itself still stands as an expression of congressional will. That expression appears to place a
limit on DOI's authority far short of 200 miles. See supra Part liA.
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common law in many ways, 136 but unlike common law it is extremely
difficult to determine precisely at what point it arises. 137 Acts of Congress
occur at specific times, and parties claiming that customary international
law supersedes acts of Congress would have to show with some accuracy
when a customary law arose.138
In the context of the OCSLA and the EEZ another policy reason exists for
not interpreting customary law as extending the existing statutory scheme.
Regulation of ocean resources is governed by a complex and intertwined
group of statutory schemes. 139 The EEZ proclamation claims for the United
States enormous new areas of the seabed. Not only is the area greatly
increased, but the implications of exploiting its resources may be quite
different than for the continental shelf. Only about three percent of the
United States' continental shelf itself has been explored; 140 the EEZ pro-
clamation presents the United States with a vast new area even less
explored. Development of this new area should be orderly and well-
planned, with consideration for the long-range implications. Unilateral
extension of DOI's jurisdiction, without careful statutory development,
does not provide the long-range order that is required.
V. CONCLUSION
Neither the President's proclamation nor the customary law of the EEZ
should be interpreted to extend the existing scheme of the OCSLA. Al-
though the jurisdiction established in the OCSLA is partially ambulatory, it
should not be interpreted to extend beyond the edge of the geological
continental shelf. Moreover, the Shelf Convention controls the definition of
the Continental Shelf in the OCSLA, and is limited to the submerged
portion of the continental land mass. For DOI to unilaterally extend its
authority under the OCSLA amounts to an illegitimate executive extension
of its own authority without implementing legislation.
136. See supra notes 95-111 and accompanying text.
137. See North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic
of Germany/Netherlands), 1969 I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Feb. 20, 1969), paras. 60-78, for an example of
the difficulties encountered in determining even the existence of a customary principle.
138. As an example, in 1976 Congress enacted legislation extending the United States' exclusive
fishing zone to 200 miles. Fishery Conservation Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-82 (1982)). Sometime shortly before, during, or after enactment, customary law
arguably recognized a state's right to extend its exclusive fishing zone to 200 miles. If Congress had
established a zone other than 200 miles, it would be difficult to determine whether the customary law
superseded the Act, or whether the Act superseded customary law.
139. See NAToNAL ADvIsoRY COMMrrmE ON OCEANS AND ATmOSPHERE, supra note 54, at app. E.
140. Id. at 1.
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Furthermore, the new customary law of the EEZ should not override the
OCSLA or the domestic force of the Shelf Convention. Although custom-
ary international law may control in a case in which no domestic law is
controlling, it should not have force in the presence of a contrary domestic
law, regardless of whether that law precedes it. This is the case under an
interpretation of customary law that follows eighteenth century notions of
the role of customary law in domestic courts. It is also the case under an
interpretation of customary law as a sole executive act, because the Presi-
dent does not have constitutional authority to annex new territory to the
United States and prescribe laws to govern it.
Congress is considering legislation to implement President Reagan's
EEZ proclamation.141 The proclamation claims important new resources
for the United States, and vast new areas. There are already numerous acts
of Congress and regulatory schemes of other executive agencies affecting
the submerged territory of the United States. Exploitation of the deep
seabed claimed by President Reagan should be orderly and carefully
planned. But the current legislation was not intended nor designed to
accomplish this. Congress should take steps to create a regime for the
orderly exploitation of the deep seabed and, as importantly, should act to
prevent future claims of power by the executive based on a precedent of
congressional acquiescence.
Donna Darm
141. H.R. 2061. In addition, Congress is considering legislation to temporarily prohibit any hard
mineral leasing in the Gorda Ridge area. H.R. 5403, 98th Cong. 2d Sess. (1984) ("Ocean Minerals
Resources Development Act").
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